A Kern County judge has ruled that the Sheriff's Department has violated the provisions of the Public Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights Act during its investigation of terminated deputy Scott Coburn, and ordered appropriate evidentiary sanctions against the Department in Coburn's upcoming Civil Service appeal hearing.
The case evolved from a complaint by a fellow deputy that Coburn had not gone to a call allegedly involving a man with a gun. That deputy later accumulated computer and other information regarding Coburn's supposed whereabouts, and complained to a supervisor that Coburn had failed to back him. That supervisor in turn spoke to Coburn's supervisor about what he had learned. The latter sought to corroborate the information provided to him by speaking with the complainant personally and examining computer information.
Two days after the incident, Coburn's supervisor summoned him into the sergeant's office without notice and began asking questions about the circumstances related to the call. Prior to doing so, Coburn was not advised that the supervisor was conducting an interrogation, or the specific nature of such interrogation. The interrogation was not recorded. Subsequently, the Department developed a case to terminate Coburn in substantial part on what the supervisor claimed was said in the interrogation with Coburn, but which Coburn adamantly disputed.
During the Skelly process, Coburn, who was represented by Bill Hadden of Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine, maintained that the Department had violated Government Code Sections 3303(b) and 3303(c), by failing to notify Coburn that it was conducting an interrogation, and failing to tell him the nature of the investigation prior to the interrogation. The Department rejected those contentions, denying that the meeting with the supervisor constituted an interrogation that was subject to the Act. Coburn was subsequently terminated based on information the Department claimed to have obtained during the disputed interview.
Prior to going forward with the Civil Service appeal, Bill Hadden filed a Petition on Coburn's behalf in Superior Court pursuant to Government Code Section 3309.5 alleging violations of the Act and requesting appropriate injunctive relief on the use of evidence gathered in violation of its provisions.
In contesting the Petition, the County made two fundamental arguments. First, it insisted that the supervisor's contact was excluded from the Act by the terms of Government Code Section 3303(i), which states in pertinent part that the Act Ashall not apply to any interrogation of a public safety officer in the normal course of duty...@ The supervisor, the County maintained, was merely asking questions pursuant to his routine obligations.
Alternatively, the County argued that even if such were not so, the Act still did not apply to the supervisor's actions, because it was never the supervisor's intention to seek discipline for Coburn, even if Coburn had not gone to the call. Since Government Code Section 3300, et seq., only applies when an officer is "subjected to interrogation...that could lead to punitive action...", the County alleged, the Act was inapplicable if no disciplinary action was contemplated.
The Court found the County's arguments to be unavailing.
First, the Court concluded that the supervisor's questioning of Coburn after a systematic accumulation of evidence in the aftermath of a complaint was not "an interrogation in the normal course of duty", and was instead an interrogation as part of a typical internal investigation. Therefore, the Court held, Coburn was entitled to be told that his supervisor was conducting an interrogation, as well as to the nature of that interrogation prior to any questioning.
Next, the Court found the argument that "no discipline was contemplated" was a hollow one, as the supervisor's subjective (and in this case, unreasonable) belief that no discipline was forthcoming was not dispositive of the issue. Moreover, the County's position was completely contradicted by the Sheriff's own charge letter against Coburn in which he detailed his dissatisfaction with Coburn's alleged failure to respond to the call, describing it as a significant act of misconduct. Obviously, even if Coburn's supervisor felt that no discipline was warranted, that sentiment was not shared by the Sheriff himself.
Finally, the County asked the Court to disregard the violations even if proven, alleging that no prejudice had occurred to Coburn. This argument was summarily rejected. Clearly, the failure of the Department to fully advise Coburn of his rights under the Act resulted in no tape recording of the interrogation being made, or of Coburn even being made aware that he had a right to tape record the questioning by his supervisor. But for the violations, Coburn maintained, he would have been able to prove his innocence through a tape recording of the unlawful interrogation. The Court agreed, and issued a Writ of Mandate to the Civil Service Commission restricting the use of the County=s purported evidence.
Coburn is grateful for LDF's support throughout the process, and looks forward to vindication at his hearing.